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Ethnoclassification,
Ethnoecology and the Imagination
par
Peter D. DWYER*
RÉSUMÉ**
Deux trajectoires de pensée en ethnoclassification,
l’une associée à l’approche de Brent Berlin, l’autre à
l’approche de Ralph Bulmer, ont influencé les dévelop-
pements, respectivement en anthropologie cognitive (y
compris en psychologie évolutionniste) et en ethnoéco-
logie. La première approche est traitée brièvement. La
deuxième est ici explorée plus en détail. Le but de
l’ethnoécologie est de comprendre et d’expliquer l’éco-
logie en tant qu’expérience vécue et, en finale, le projet
devrait révéler la diversité de l’expérience écologique
humaine. Il est soutenu que l’imagination est un élément
fondamental de ces expériences. Dans le cadre de cette
argumentation, un modèle de l’origine de l’imagina-
tion ¢ de la capacité et des implications de l’expression
figurative ¢ est proposé.
M- : anthropologie cognitive, ethnoclassifica-
tion, ethnoécologie, imagination, abduction, évolu-
tion humaine.
ABSTRACT
Two trajectories of thought within ethnoclassifica-
tion, one associated with the approach of Brent Berlin,
the other with the approach of Ralph Bulmer, have
influenced developments within cognitive anthropology
(including evolutionary psychology) and ethnoecology
respectively. The former is treated briefly. The latter is
explored in greater detail. The aim of ethnoecology is to
understand and explain ecology as experienced and,
ultimately, the project should reveal the diversity of
human ecological experience. It is argued that the ima-
gination is fundamental to those experiences.Within the
frame of that argument a model of the origin of the
imagination ¢ of the capacity for and implications of
figurative expression ¢ is proposed.
K: cognitive anthropology, ethnoclassifica-
tion, ethnoecology, imagination, abduction, human
evolution.
Really new concepts, having no names in current language, always make their earliest appearance in
metaphorical statements; therefore the beginning of any theoretical structure is inevitably marked by
fantastic inventions.
(Langer, 1957: x-xi)
Each and every object in the world has its own history, it goes without saying, which is a result of some
other history, and so on; forever continuing. It can be triggered, Ellen was told, by a name. And the
unexpected can appear in small and large lumps.
(Bail, 1998: 109)
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In this article I sketch a trajectory from ethno-
classification to ethnoecology. My emphasis will
be with theoretical perspectives and not with
ethnographic particulars. I shall argue that the
imagination should be understood as fundamen-
tal to the project of ethnoecology.
Within the broad field of ethnoclassification,
as this developed through the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s, I first identify two trajectories that have,
respectively, influenced developments within
cognitive anthropology and evolutionary psy-
chology on the one hand and ethnoecology on
the other. I briefly critique the former and note
the contribution of interest in traditional ecolo-
gical knowledge to development of the latter. I
then direct attention to recent contributions by
Ingold (2000) and, with reference to the work of
Bateson (1972, 1979), seek to expand the for-
mer’s theoretical perspective by prioritizing the
role of the imagination as underlying the relatio-
nal world that is the proper subject matter of
ethnoecological enquiry. From a relational pers-
pective, and as Ingold (1997) has argued, the
ecological and social lives of actors, human or
otherwise, must be understood as mutually cons-
tituted or, as Minnegal (1996) expressed it, « a
necessary unity ». I use the term « ethnoeco-
logy » in reference to ecology as experienced and
in contrast to « scientific ecology » where the
latter may be understood as ecology as analysed.
The perspectives implied are those that, in an
earlier terminology, were referred to as emic and
etic respectively (Pike, 1954: 8; Harris, 1968: 568-
604; see also Rappaport, 1968: 237-41, on cogni-
zed and operational models). The article should
be understood as an opinion piece and not as a
review.
Ethnoclassification
Early approaches to ethnoclassification ¢
particularly ethnozoology and ethnobotany ¢
were concerned with a search for order, or pat-
tern, in the ways in which « other people » name
and categorize the living worlds that they expe-
rience (e.g. Conklin, 1969). This was my point of
entry into the field, indeed into anthropology, in
the early 1970s. I entered as a zoologist ¢ ecology
was my speciality ¢ with some interest in ques-
tions of origin and classification (e.g. Dwyer,
1971). At that time two themes predominated,
two theoretically motivated lines of enquiry.
The first of these themes was itself twofold. A
concern with cross-cultural regularities in the
hierarchical ordering of categories, with taxo-
nomy. And a concern with cross-cultural regula-
rities in the conceptual content of low-ranked
categories within those taxonomies; with the
extent to which people all over the world reco-
gnise the same discontinuities in the natural
world, particularly at the level of something ana-
logous to « species ». The contributions of Ber-
lin, Bulmer, their colleagues and their intellec-
tual descendants were of great importance here
(e.g. Berlin et al., 1966, 1973; Berlin, 1992; Bul-
mer and Menzies, 1972, 1973; Bulmer et al.,
1975; Ellen, 1975; Hays, 1979; Hunn, 1977).
The second theme was a concern with lan-
guage universals, with cross-cultural regularities
in both the conceptual content and the temporal
appearance of higher order categories ¢ Berlin’s
« life forms » or Bulmer’s « primary taxa » ¢
within local taxonomies. Here, the contributions
of Brown and his colleagues were very influential
(e.g. Brown, 1979, 1984, 1986; Brown and
Witkowski, 1982).
I identify two primary trajectories of thought
in these areas of scholarship. The first takes us
rather directly to questions of cognition and, to
varying degrees, the domain of theory now
known as evolutionary psychology. The second
takes us less directly to ethnoecology and, I shall
suggest, promises an understanding of the rela-
tionship between mind and nature which is dif-
ferent to that offered by evolutionary psycho-
logy. My sympathies ¢ my biases ¢ are with
this second trajectory. To some extent these two
trajectories are informed by differences of
approach taken by what I shall call the Berlin
school on the one hand and the Bulmer school
on the other.
Before tracing out those trajectories I shall
reflect critically on the work of ethnotaxonomy.
I refer here to the many papers and monographs
which have presented other people’s classifica-
tions of animals and plants as taxonomic hierar-
chies. My general concern with nearly all this
work, including my own (e.g. Dwyer, 1976), is
that the representations of other people’s
understandings were, in the final analysis, groun-
ded in, and deeply prejudiced by, our understan-
dings. What was presented as « their » taxonomy
was, ultimately, the closest match that could be
found to « our » taxonomy. This was achieved by
selective use of data and by devising over-
arching, metaclassifications that prioritized
« western » or « scientific » understandings. (See
Ellen, 1993, who elaborated many of the matters
I raise in this and the following section.)
For example, many ethnoscientists, especially
those who lived for an extended period in the
field and were doing other anthropological
research in addition to ethnoclassification,
understood that the people they lived with car-
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ved up the world in a number of cross-cutting
ways. In different contexts and for different
purposes those people grouped things in diffe-
rent ways. They operated with multiple classifi-
cations of nature. These, of course, confounded
scientific aims and expectations. They disrupted
the search for generality. The difficulty was resol-
ved by resorting to a classification of classifica-
tions, by distinguishing « special purpose classi-
fications » from « general purpose classifi-
cations » (e.g. Berlin et al., 1966). The former
might deal with dietary, medicinal or ritual
concerns and so forth. The latter always dealt
with morphology and linguistic order and, thus,
always emerged, for the people analysed, as the
closest approximation to the kind of taxonomies
favoured by scientists. But, of course, this
approach was inherently arrogant. The « genera-
lity » of general purpose classifications was only
in the minds of the analysts. It could be most
easily elicited in a very « special » context of
formal question and answer interviews that were
divorced from the ways in which people expe-
rienced nature, in which they « lived » with their
classifications. It was highly improbable, I sug-
gest, that a general purpose classification elicited
by an analyst was any more than another special
purpose classification to the people concerned.
If we turn to questions about discontinuities
in nature, about « species » and language univer-
sals ¢ questions about cross-cultural regularities
in the conceptual content of lower and higher
order categories ¢ then I have similar concerns.
We were offered answers that were too tight, too
formal, too enthusiastic in their search for pan-
human generalities. The truths revealed were
partial. They were never experiential. They were,
again, divorced from the life-worlds of the peo-
ple who were studied.
Perhaps this might be seen most clearly in
work on life-forms as language universals. The
model for this work was, surely, earlier studies of
colour universals (Berlin and Kay, 1969; see also
Shepard, 1992, Davidoff et al., 1999). But, here,
of course, shared physiology and the laws of
physics were implicated in ways that could never
apply to the diverse permutations of people and
wildlife existing in the real world of ecological
interaction. Certainly, all these studies have offe-
red insight into ways in which processes of
human classification may be constrained or
expressed. I am less confident that they have
revealed truths about the lived experience of
people.
In summary, an unfortunate consequence of
these studies was to objectify systems of
knowledge and to render invisible the human
actors who build, experience, use and modify
those systems. Despite the cautionary remarks
of some workers, classical approaches to ethno-
classification turned away from the truths that
people are embedded within local environments
and that knowledge of the natural world arises
through their engagement with those environ-
ments (cf. Ellen, 1993; Ingold, 1992). In short,
classical approaches sacrificed the relational
foundations and ecological embeddedness of all
knowledge in favour of devising formal schemes
divorced from human agency.
Trajectories: Berlin versus Bulmer
I turn now to differences in the approaches of
the Bulmer and Berlin schools. These differences,
I suggest, are implicated in the trajectories of
thought leading to ethnoecology on the one
hand and evolutionary psychology on the other.
The central difference, as I interpret it, is reflec-
ted in the fact that the principles Bulmer used to
organize data were looser, less formal, and ulti-
mately less constraining of thought, than those
used by Berlin.
Thus, Bulmer represented the rank of taxa as
primary, secondary, tertiary and so forth and, in
so doing, provided opportunities for other peo-
ple’s taxa to « speak in their own right », to fall
where they would into an hierarchical structure
(Bulmer, 1970). Berlin, by contrast, represented
the rank of taxa as unique beginner, life form,
generic, specific and varietal and, thereafter, was
constrained to provide awkward, and often shif-
ting, definitions of those categories (Berlin et al.,
1973; see also Brown, 1987) and to force other
people’s taxa to conform to those definitions.
Again, when exploring the question of cross-
cultural regularities in the recognition of discon-
tinuities in nature, Bulmer proposed the notion
of specieme ¢ a group of « creatures marked off
from all other animals... by multiple distinctions
of appearance, habitat, and behaviour »; a
notion that was independent of, and unconstrai-
ned by, his own system for assigning rank within
a taxonomic hierarchy (Bulmer and Tyler, 1968:
372-3). Berlin, by contrast, conflated the possible
existence of a fundamental discontinuity in
nature with his own imposed system of ordering
taxa hierarchically. Berlin’s « genera » were both
conceptually fixed ranks within a taxonomy and
the most probable candidates for giving expres-
sion to recognised discontinuities in nature (Ber-
lin, 1973).
In effect, Berlin proposed a universal model
designed to accommodate all data; a model, into
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which each analyst was expected to fit his or her
data. Bulmer proposed a scheme that encoura-
ged further exploration of data; data which were,
so often, less than tidy. The word « tidy » is
important here. A set of data organized within
the frame of Berlin’s principles nearly always
appeared more coherent than a set of data orga-
nized within the frame of Bulmer’s suggestions.
It appeared more coherent because it had been
accommodated within a fixed framework rather
than interpreted in the light of one that was
inherently fluid. Perhaps that was a disadvantage
of Bulmer’s approach? There were, however,
significant advantages. I shall return to those.
First, however, I shall say something of the move
to evolutionary psychology.
Towards Evolutionary Psychology
The lessons that seemed to emerge from the
work of Berlin, Brown and colleagues ¢ the
American school ¢ concerned universals of cate-
gorization and of the conceptual content of
some of those categories. The lessons concerned
pattern recognition. They appeared instructive
in relation to human cognition (e.g. Atran, 1990;
Boster, 1996). The connection to the developing
field of evolutionary psychology is strikingly evi-
dent in recent work by Atran who wrote:
« Humans everywhere think about plants and ani-
mals in highly structured ways. People have similar
folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-
based, species-like groups and the ranking of species
into lower- and higher-order groups... This supports a
modular view of folk-biology as a core domain of
human knowledge and as a special player, or ‘‘core
meme’’, in the selection process by which cultures
evolve.1 » (1998: 547)
I have three difficulties with these understan-
dings. First, with reference to declared universals
of taxonomic structure and conceptual content,
I assert, as did a number of commentators on
Atran’s article (e.g. Hays, 1998; MacLaury,
1998; Morton, 1998; Thompson, 1998), that folk
taxonomies are more messy than Atran
implied2. Secondly, with reference to memes,
core or otherwise, I assert that theories of uni-
versal Darwinism are unlikely to reveal answers
to questions about the origin of the imagination
and, hence, the evolution of cultural forms. At
base, as argued below, this is because the imagi-
nation arises within an extra-genetic domain of
fluid and facultative response, a developmental
domain which cannot be reduced to an orderly
combination of high fidelity, high fecundity
replicators and non-Lamarckian transmission
between individuals (cf. Odling-Smee, 1995;
Saunders, 1998)3.
And, thirdly, with reference to « modularity »
I assert that Atran’s approach, indeed the
approach of evolutionary psychology in general,
is an instance of a mode of explanation, usually
flawed, which qualifies as homuncular thinking.
Examples of this mode of thought include early
representations of genotype for geneticists, deep
structures for Lévi-Straussians, innate grammar
for Chomskians, habitus for practice theorists
and modules of the mind for evolutionary psy-
chologists. In each case the analyst is confronted
by an array of facts, of appearances in the world,
and seeks to explain them ¢ in a sense to explain
them away ¢ by locating an essence of those
1. The epidemiological approach to cognitive anthropology developed by Sperber (1985, 1996) is theoretically less constrai-
ned than the approach of Atran. Like the latter, however, it is informed by a methodology that prioritizes analytical concerns
over experiential concerns and, as evident in Bloch and Sperber (2002), may rely upon hypothesized states (e.g. « attractiveness »
and « catchiness ») which are difficult to establish within an empirical frame.
2. See, for example, studies by Tambiah (1969) and Waddy (1982) where higher categories of proposed folk taxonomies are
organized around ecological rather than morphological criteria. Note also the methodological sleight-of-hand entailed in
assigning taxa, which folk assert to be unplaced within a hierarchical structure, a quasi-formal status as « unaffiliated taxa ».
Reports by Clark (1981), Dwyer and Hyndman (1983) and Bulmer (1985) challenge conventional understandings of a fixed
array of possible « life form » taxa and Sillitoe (1980, 2002; see also Ellen, 1993: 220-221) has consistently highlighted
inconsistency and confusion in folk classifications.
3. Waddington (1960: 94-96; see also 1969) wrote: « Biological evolution... is carried out by an ‘‘evolutionary system’’ which
involves four major factors...: a genetic system, which engenders new variation by the process of mutation and transmits it by
chromosomal genes; an epigenetic system, which translates the information in the fertilized egg and that which impinges on it
from the environment into the character of the reproducing adult; an exploitative system, by which an animal chooses and
modifies the environment to which it will submit itself; and a system of natural selective pressures, originating from the
environment and operating on the combined result of the other three systems ». Odling-Smee (1995) drew on these understan-
dings to direct attention to mechanisms of inheritance that are extragenetic; that arise, in effect, within the epigenetic and
exploitative systems recognised by Waddington (see also Laland, 1992). He argued that the products of development, learning
and culture arise from facultative responses and, further, that those products influence the future course of evolution. He
considered that his model accommodated « ecological inheritance » in addition to « genetic inheritance ». From a different
perspective Gray (1997: 393) argued that « all phenotypes are constructed, not transmitted » and « must develop through
organism-environment transactions ».
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appearances within the interior of the form
which manifests them, and to then re-read that
imagined essence as the mechanism which trans-
lates the inside to the outside. The internalized
essence of that which is external is an homuncu-
lus. Thus, in its earliest representations, before
 was discovered and unravelled, the geno-
type was the imagined and mathematically justi-
fied essence of the phenotype. The genotype was
pure, the phenotype a flawed image (cf. Griffiths,
2002). In a similar way habitus, as a postulated
set of embodied dispositions, represents the
essence of a social world which is manifest,
externally, as practice (e.g. Bourdieu, 1998: 77)4.
And so it is, I suggest, with modules of the
mind and core memes. Patterns which seem to
connect ways of classifying, ways of thinking, in
the external world are reduced to essence, objec-
tified as internal mechanisms, as fixed modules,
and then turned back to explain the external
phenomena from which they were analytically
derived. In homuncular thinking externalities,
appearances, are taken as epiphenomena. The
task is to locate and extol their essence. The
advantage of this mode of thinking is that
awkward variation may be treated as aberration.
The disadvantage is that appearances and varia-
tion may be the truths by which people live. And
it is this possibility that will take me in the direc-
tion of ethnoecology. First, however, I should
say something about  ¢ traditional ecological
knowledge (cf. Ellen et al., 2000).
A Digression on TEK
During the early 1980s there was an active
debate about the underlying purpose of folk bio-
logical classifications. Did they primarily serve
intellectual or utilitarian ends, a mix of both or
neither (e.g. Berlin and Berlin, 1983; Hays, 1982;
Hunn, 1982; see also Brown, 1985; Lévi-Strauss,
1966)?
All sides of the debate were impressed by the
fact that systems of naming and classifying the
natural world revealed that people have exten-
sive and intimate knowledge of their experienced
world. The utilitarian argument promoted the
view that knowledge was « adaptive »; that there
was a close relationship between people’s
knowledge of the natural world and the ways in
which they lived in that world. Systems of
naming and of classifying came to be seen as
part and parcel of environment-specific survival
strategies of different language groups. In turn,
this understanding underpinned a growing inte-
rest in what became known as « traditional eco-
logical knowledge » or  (e.g. Clarke, 1990;
Johannes, 1981; Morauta et al., 1982; Posey and
Balée, 1989; Williams and Baines, 1993). Studies
made under the banner of  became divorced
from a primary concern with systems of naming
and classifying plants and animals and
increasingly emphasized relationships ¢ usually
functional relationships ¢ between people and
wildlife. To the extent that « knowledge » was
understood to index those relationships so too it
was sometimes regarded as extractable, as a
potential commodity.
Perhaps paradoxically,  enthusiasts
included scholars with adaptationist and
evolutionary leanings and others who were
not enchanted by these seemingly determinist
notions from biology.  enthusiasts were often
activists, though activists of very different sorts
(cf. Dwyer, 1994). With an explicit or implicit
appeal to Rousseau some argued that we could
learn much, especially about conservation, from
« the wisdom of the elders » (e.g. Knudtson and
Suzuki, 1992). With a concern for disadvantaged
or oppressed peoples, others extolled traditional
ecological knowledge ¢ the fruits of the forest ¢
as a potential route to cultural survival through
participation in a global market (e.g. Clay 1992;
cf. Cox and Elmqvist, 1993). And with more
nuanced appreciation of both anthropological
scholarship, and the hazards of eco-colonialism,
others moved  into well theorized considera-
tions of intellectual property and the rights that
might adhere to this (e.g. Brosius, 1997; Brunois,
1999; Escobar, 1998; Kirsch, 2001; Strathern,
1999).
The rise of  achieved two things. First, it
animated interest in, and often provided a subs-
tantive data base for, studies made under the
rubrics of both development and political eco-
logy (e.g. Little, 1999; Paarup-Laursen and
Krogh, 2003; Purcell, 1998; Sillitoe, 1998, 2002).
Secondly, it redirected attention from names and
classifications that had been disembedded from
4. By analogy with the word abduction (« reaching out »; see Peirce [1950a,b] and note 6) the mode of reasoning entailed in
homuncular thinking might be labeled adduction « reaching toward »). Thus, adduction is implicated when thinkers postulate
the existence of what is essentially imaginary to explain away an awkward gap between two supposedly connected sets of facts.
The products of adduction are of homuncular form. They recreate an essence of one domain of facts and locate it within the
« body » of the other set of facts as a mechanism which supposedly translates from one to the other. Abduction deals in
processes that connect; adduction deals in essentialized states that connect. Abduction reaches out to the world; adduction
reaches in to the centre.
ETHNOCLASSIFICATION, ETHNOECOLOGY AND THE IMAGINATION 15
local contexts in the course of analysis to people-
environment relations that were sometimes
encoded in those names and classifications and
were sometimes expressed in other ways, perhaps
simply in the course of a person’s engagement
with environment, with land and with other peo-
ple. This refocus of attention was also significant
in the development of ethnoecology.
Towards Ethnoecology
To me there is one body of theoretical writing
which stands out in pointing the way to what I
regard as ethnoecology. This is the work that
Ingold has published through the past ten years.
Much of this is included in his recent collection
The Perception of the Environment: Essays on
Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (2000). The rela-
ted work of, particularly, Bird-David, Descola,
Hornborg and Pálsson is also important to the
development of ethnoecology (e.g. Bird-David,
1990, 1993, 1999; Descola, 1994; Descola and
Pálsson, 1996; Hornborg, 1998; see also Roeps-
torff et al., 2003). What Ingold offers is a subs-
tantive and internally consistent body of writing
that both engages with other theoretical posi-
tions while sketching a program for future
research and understanding. But, I shall argue
later, that program, as Ingold develops it,
contains a weakness, a lacuna.
Ingold’s work did not emerge from a specific
interest in human knowledge systems. Rather,
his concern was to dissolve the dualities that so
insistently separated biophysical from socio-
cultural understandings of people and, indeed,
separated the practitioners of those viewpoints.
He sought to articulate a vision of the whole
such that organisms (or persons) « grew » within
fields of relationships that were themselves esta-
blished through the participation of those orga-
nisms in particular local environments. Here
Ingold borrowed from, and brought together, an
« ecological » critique of mainstream cognitive
psychology and a « developmentalist » critique
of mainstream neo-Darwinian biology (e.g. Gib-
son, 1979; Goodwin, 1994). Within the frame of
that synthesis the human being was to be unders-
tood « as a single locus of creative growth within
a continually unfolding field of relationships »
(Ingold, 2000: 5-6).
In his essays on « livelihood », Ingold
addressed issues of subsistence procurement
with particular reference to hunter-gatherer
societies. By arguing that ways of « acting in the
environment are always ways of perceiving »
that environment, he sought to dispose of the
artificial separation between practically-
grounded subsistence and imaginatively-
grounded cosmology (Ingold, 2000: 9). He offe-
red, instead, an appreciation of the importance
of engagement with the human and non-human
constituents of their environment in grounding
the knowledge that each person has of, and
brings to bear on, that environment.
In his essays on « dwelling » Ingold challen-
ged the view, as he saw it, that people construct
the world, or attach meaning to it, prior to acting
in it; the view that naive subjects enter a pre-
given world. Rather, he argued that it is through
engagement with an experienced world that the
world itself comes into being around the orga-
nism (or person) and, similarly, that the consti-
tuents of that world « take on significance
through their incorporation into a regular pat-
tern of life activity » (Ingold, 2000: 153). Enga-
gement with the world, meanings attached to the
world and the world as experienced are indivisi-
bly connected and simultaneously created. In the
development of this argument, Ingold’s essay on
globes and spheres is particularly instructive in
contrasting the lived experiences of inhabitants
of so-called modern and pre-modern worlds
(Ingold, 2000: 209-218). The opacity of a globe
connotes a separation of society and nature,
with humans on the outside, looking in, but,
perhaps, seeing little; the transparency of a
sphere connotes a unitary experience of a world
seen from within.
And, in his third set of essays, Ingold develo-
ped and explored the idea that skill is best
understood as referring to « the capabilities of
action and perception of the whole organic
being » which dwells in « a richly structured
environment ». Skills, he argued, are as much
« biological as cultural », they are not « trans-
mitted from generation to generation but are
regrown in each » (Ingold, 2000: 5). As is his
wont, Ingold again framed his insights through
the strategy of challenging a distinction he
judged to be flawed. In this case a distinction
between the supposed foundations of art and
technology; intellectual « design » or crea-
tivity in the first case and mechanical execu-
tion in the second. Both, he asserted, may be
understood with reference to skill. Both
« grow » in and from an on-going process of
enskilment ¢ a process that, in the act of engage-
ment, may entail a directing of attention by one
practitioner to another rather than the transmis-
sion of fixed rules or representations (see also
Pálsson, 1994).
Ingold represented his synthesis as drawing
together perspectives that are relational, ecologi-
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cal and developmental. There are, perhaps, some
difficulties in the way he articulates the social
and, more so, appears to marginalize or dismiss
the cultural5. To me, however, he has offered
much of, though not all, the necessary founda-
tions of ethnoecology.
An Ethnographic Interlude
Since 2001, with colleagues, I have been wor-
king with commercial fishers in the Australian
state of Victoria. Most may be classed as small-
scale, family-oriented fishers; they are life-style
fishers.
In the earliest phases of this work we learned
the names of many boats. Boats were an impor-
tant part of the biography of fishers. Often we
also learned the origin of the name. Two themes
dominated these tales of origin. In the majority
of cases names reflected affiliations ¢ to people
or to places ¢ that had been created by the person
who named the boat. Boats were named after
wives and children, after female affines, but
rarely after parents or siblings. They were names
about self-created past and present relationships
in the world. In most of the remaining cases the
name of the boat reflected either an imagined
quality or an intended purpose of the boat. They
were statements about the hopes and aspirations
of the namer, about future relationships in the
world. These latter names were given by fishers
who, at some level, sought to explore the current
limits, the margins, of the fishing industry or
who were themselves marginal to the industry
and the community of « those who fish »
(Dwyer et al., 2003).
The naming of boats is, of course, a private
act. But a named boat is in the public domain.
Gradually we came to appreciate that, through
the bestowal of names, and through their asso-
ciations with many fishers, boats were personali-
zed and themselves developed a biography.
Named and personalized boats served to socia-
lize the sea, to recreate on the water the on-shore
attachments and connections entailed in the
names that those boats carried.
To fishers and their families, named and
personalized boats become an embodiment of
meanings. But those meanings do not arise de
novo, they are not inscribed upon a blank slate.
People, surely, engage with environments before
they name places, things and beings within them.
As Ingold argued, meanings arise from that
engagement: people « think the thoughts they
do » because they dwell in, and engage with, the
world (2000: 186). Names emerge from, and
re-present, human-environment relations which
have been constituted through that recursive
interaction. And, thereafter, they alter the
understandings that each person brings to future
engagement and the interpretations that all
people derive from that engagement. Boats at
sea, named and personalized boats, may be
readily appreciated as exemplars of the transfor-
mation of an unmarked environment into
« humanized, historicized space » (Weiner, 1991:
50); as ever-mobile places affording fixed social
reference (paraphrased from Dwyer et al., 2003:
20).
And that creative ¢ that human ¢ achievement,
I assert, may be understood only in a context of
an on-going engagement, of an on-going rela-
tionship, between people and environment. A
dialectical relationship which I take to be central
to the study of ethnoecology.
The Primal Trope and the Imagination
I suggested earlier that a set of taxonomic data
organized within a Bulmerian frame might
appear less tidy than a set organized within a
Berlinian frame. I suggested also that this see-
ming disadvantage might, in fact, be turned to
advantage.
But why is Bulmer’s organizational scheme
less tidy than that of Berlin? I think for a very
simple reason. A reason that is, perhaps, most
transparent in his seminal paper « Why is the
5. Some commentators misinterpret Ingold as allowing no space for the social when, in fact, his dual concerns, as I
understand them, are to deny existence of, first, a social domain that is uniquely human and, secondly, a neat dichotomy of
relationships between persons and « others » into those that are social and those that are not. Ingold has been also criticized for
adopting an extreme position in denying that non-Western people’s distinguish between, for example, the « biological processes
of reproduction and the social processes of nurture » (Astuti, 2000: 430-431; cf. Minnegal and Dwyer, in press). My concerns are
different. Ingold’s style of argument is internally consistent, coherent and free of ambiguity or tautology. Sometimes, however,
in disposing of the dualities which pattern so much scholarly discourse he appears to attribute these same qualities (of
consistency, coherence, etc.) to the non-Western people of whom he writes. But a lack of internal consistency and much
ambiguity may be common and necessary features of most human systems; they may facilitate both communication between
components of those systems and expressions of agency by their participants. By way of illustration, despite the logical
contradictions identified by Ingold (2000: 132-151), both engagement with environment and a commitment to ancestry may
have often featured as parallel discourses in constructions concerning ownership and use rights to land by indigenous peoples
and, in different circumstances, empowered those people to act to their own advantage on the basis of one or the other discourse
(see, for example, Dwyer and Minnegal, 1999).
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cassowary not a bird? » (1967) but is evident, as
well, in related explorations of the question of
anomaly (1978, 1979, 1986). Here he engaged
with the work of scholars such as Douglas (1970,
1973) and Tambiah (1969) whose contributions
to the understanding of animal classification
were not beholden to the developing methodo-
logical frame of ethnoscience and whose work
held little salience to most American ethnoscien-
tists. Those contributions, of course, concerned
symbols and symbolization. And Bulmer’s
contributions to the organization of ethnoclas-
sificatory data appear less tidy than Berlin’s for
the simple reason that he was an anthropologist
of such broad persuasion. « Man and a Half » is
the appropriate lead title of the collection of
essays that honour his scholarship (Pawley,
1991). An « academic bricoleur » he once wrote
of himself. A bricoleur who might « take this
piece of super-structure from Lévi-Strauss, that
metaphorical connecting link from Mary Dou-
glas », and so on, as required by the questions he
addressed (Bulmer, 1974: 94).
He was too modest. Bulmer’s writings in
ethnoscience were always and insistently
contextualized within an overarching and
broad appreciation of generic anthropologi-
cal concerns. To read « Why is the cassowary
not a bird? » is to understand that questions of
ethnoclassification may be never divorced from
those of symbolization. It was Bulmer’s writings
that, in the first instance, challenged my zoologi-
cal imagination and led me to confront issues of
metaphor, of tropes, of polarity and analogy,
of objectivity and subjectivity and, eventually,
to re-discover the relational foundations of
ecology as experienced (Dwyer, 1979, 1986,
1996).
Implicit in much early ethnoscientific work is
an assumption that the mental process under-
lying the classification of nature is one of divi-
ding or separating out the world. This is implicit
in much of the work of Lévi-Strauss (e.g. 1966).
It is true, of course, that the taxonomies which
result from this process prioritize separations,
divisions, oppositions. They prioritize polarity.
The taxonomies are products of a classifying
process. In the « here and now » polarity struc-
tures those products. It is easy to assume, there-
fore, that the process by which those taxonomies
were generated was itself grounded in polariza-
tion, in opposing one part of the world to some
other part to construct contrasting taxa of diffe-
rent content or contrasting totems with different
referents.
I do not agree with this understanding of
the classificatory process. Process has been
confounded with product. My preferred posi-
tion prioritizes analogy as fundamental to the
process of classification and polarity as funda-
mental to the products ¢ the taxonomies ¢ that
result. Humans detect similarities between
things in the world. Through their engage-
ment with the world things are brought into
conjunction. In the imagination those things
appear as related, as being in some sense like
one another. The relationship is metaphoric but
may be concretized, it is perhaps given a label,
a name (Dwyer, 1979). And, henceforth, that
imagined relationship is established in the mind
as a thing that contrasts with all other things in
the world. In this sense, then, taxonomies are, in
the first instance, the unintended product of a
process of metaphorization or, more precisely,
of abduction6.
Let me travel back to the beginning ¢ to a
beginning ¢ and speculate about the origin of the
imagination. A leap of the imagination for me. A
leap into the imagination for the first humans7.
Imagine a pre-human being, engaged with
environment in much the same way that Ingold
might write of engagement. Caught up in a
myriad relations with others, both animate and
inanimate (Fig. 1a). Not all the relationships
which could exist in the world but a sample. A
sample biased by the dictates of survival and
reproduction within a specific local environ-
ment. A creature embedded in relation-
ships, reacting to and acting upon those rela-
tionships, relationships that are grounded in
exploration, social facilitation, memory, imita-
tion, learning (in all its forms), instruction and
6. Abduction is the basis of a mode of explanation, distinct from causal or functional, that takes the following form: accept
hypothesis X as true if, by so doing, the (surprising) observation A, or set of observations A... n, is a matter of course. For
example: the facts A... n (clues) are a matter of course if person X was the murderer: therefore, accept the hypothesis that X was
the murderer. Or, again: the fit of reproducing and variable organisms to their environments (set of observations each of which
carries the name « adaptation ») is a matter of course if context-dependent differential survival and reproduction (hypothesis
that carries the name « natural selection ») is true; therefore, accept the hypothesis of natural selection (cf. Peirce, 1950a, 1950b;
see also Bateson, 1979; Bateson and Bateson, 1987; Harries-Jones 1995). The products of abduction ¢ « hypotheses » about the
world ¢ are persuasive and take hold to the extent that others declare, as at the end of a good detective story, or on reading The
Origin of Species, « what a fool I was not to see that ». Bateson (1979: 142) considered that « metaphor, dream, parable, allegory,
the whole of art, the whole of science, the whole of religion, the whole of poetry, totemism » are all « instances or aggregates of
instances of abduction, within the human mental sphere ».
7. What follows is an expanded version of a summary paragraph in Dwyer (1996: 179).
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F 1. ¢ (a) A representation of the world of prehuman. A focal prehuman, Ego, is embedded at a given moment in a set
of socio-ecological relationships with some, but not all, others and objects (circles, triangles and squares) in the world.
On the figure, lines vary in thickness to reflect variation in the intensity or functional importance of particular
relationships. (b) A representation of the world of protohuman. Compare with < a >. Here the set of socio-ecological
relationships within which Ego is embedded is re-presented in Ego’s brain as an homuncular image of self. Others and
objects that are not party to those relationships (now shown as open symbols) do not contribute to that image and, hence,
from the outset, it is, but is not < known > to be, a biased reflection of all that exists.
familiarity. My creature experiences the world
but does not yet imagine it. My creature is not
self-aware8.
But now imagine the shift to self-awareness.
What could that be? How might we construct
that within the terms of reference of the lived
experience of pre-human? We have no basis for
suggesting that a capacity for self-awareness is
implanted: that a mutation arises, that God
speaks. And if that is correct then, in the first
instance, self-awareness can be neither more nor
less than an internalization of all the rela-
tionships of which pre-human was a part; rela-
tionships which had arisen in the context of
engagement with environment and which patter-
ned that engagement in the present and into the
future (Fig. 1b). Self-awareness can be no more
than an internalization of that which was exter-
nal. There was nothing else to grasp. In its ori-
gins self-awareness is a trope, the first trope, the
primal trope9. A leap into the imagination. An
error of judgement in which the outside is taken
to be the inside10.
That then is the primal trope. A familiar world
of relationships taken to metaphorize an unfa-
miliar sense of self, contradiction embodied in
an emergent notion of self and the world both
re-presented as and reduced to the statistical
mean of all extant configurations of rela-
tionships. Simultaneously an instance of meta-
phor, irony, synecdoche and metonymy. The
primal trope emerged from the experienced
world, was relational in form and genetically
uncommitted11.
But so much more is contained within this
notion. The primal trope was Machiavellian, a
8. There are huge definitional problems with regard to all matters concerning consciousness and mind, human or otherwise.
I use the word « imagination » to refer to the creative faculty that is underlain by abduction. Its products are images that have
no material existence. It is contingent upon (and coincident with) emergence of a capacity for self-reflexion that is a necessary
precursor to self-awareness. Although, in this article, I write of « self-awareness » I do not intend an abrupt transition but,
rather, a temporal continuum that is initiated by emergence of a capacity for self-reflexion. In a similar way my preference is to
distinguish « sentience », as a capacity for feeling that is evident in many plants and animals, from « consciousness », as an
awareness of feeling that is evident in, at least, many animals.
9. The word « trope » is a generic, a higher level category, for figures of speech ¢ for metaphor, metonymy, simile, irony, pun
and so forth ¢ though I extend that dictionary meaning to include, not just figurative language, but all figurative expression.
Gesture is important, and ritual or art that are not or cannot be put into words are undoubtedly important. It is tropes that
inform the resemblances humans detect between things, the relationships they infer from those things, the classificatory order
they impose upon things, and the contrasts they detect and express as differences between things; in short, the meanings they
derive from or attach to things. « The four major tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synechdoche, and irony, are cognitive
examples, respectively, of perspective, reduction, representation, and dialectic » (Parkin, 1982: xxvii).
10. The primal trope may be understood as well as the first instance in human affairs of a process of disembedding (cf.
Hornborg, 1996); a process, which, with its connotation of objectification, is usually treated as a correlate, attribute, or outcome
of modern society.
11. In this article I do not take a position with respect to either a necessary connection between tropes (cf. symbols) and
language (cf. Wagner,1972; Fernandez, 1991) or the temporal conjunction of the origins of self-awareness (cf. human
« consciousness ») and language. Many writers assert or argue for a primal association between these human characteristics
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self-deceiving image of self as the template upon
which both rhetoric and objectivity were to be
nurtured. A figurative beginning that would
implode as literal. It was, quite literally, a graven
image, hewn in or on the brain, and represented
there as a diffuse array of always malleable pro-
cesses and structures built by and recursively
building the complex analogical relations that
were its source. As the initial expression of self-
awareness, the primal trope was the substrate
upon which purposeful action and social life were
patterned. In as much as that trope was necessa-
rily fluid, shifting in expression as humans altered
their relationships with others and environ-
ments, so also it conditioned ever-changing pers-
pectives on the world and ever-changing patterns
of engagement with the world12.
And, of course, this sketch of the primal trope
aligns me firmly with Bateson’s understanding
that mind and nature are a necessary unity
(1979). It offers a perspective on cognition that is
not beholden to environments of evolutionary
adaptation or to imagined homunculi of the
mind. A perspective in which abduction is the
foundation of both the imagination and thought
and the source of all creativity13.
The primal trope returns me also to the
possibility of an enlarged perspective on
ethnoecology.
The Scope of Ethnoecology
I am impressed by Ingold’s recent writings
on livelihood, dwelling and skill. Those writings
provide a solid base from which to develop
an understanding of ways in which other
people experience ecology, of ways in which they
engage with, and built upon, the ecological
relationships of which they are a part. A solid
base from which to develop an informed ethno-
ecology. An ecology that reaches beyond
commitment to an analytical separation of
organism and environment. An ecology that
acknowledges, with Waddington (1960: 94), that
an animal « by its behaviour contributes in a
most important way to determining the nature
and intensity of the selective pressures which will
be exerted on it ». Or to understanding, with
Rappaport (1990: 69) that ecosystems are « part
of the world’s means for maintaining, if not
indeed constructing ecosystems ». And with
Uexküll (1982) that organisms lived in their own
subjective worlds and that ecological relations
are semiotic.
But I have two difficulties with Ingold’s posi-
tion. First, he disparages evolutionary thinking
more than is warranted. This complaint derives,
perhaps, from my training in and sympathies for
(e.g. Knight et al., 1995; Dennett, 1996; Deacon, 1997). I am not convinced that an intimate association in the present establishes
or requires a simultaneity of origins.
12. Three problems must be considered. First, I describe the primal trope as being an internalization of that which was
external and, thus, may be guilty of flawed homuncular thinking? If I am wrong about the primal trope then I am guilty. But if
I am correct then the protohumans, of whom I write, are innocent. They do not seek to explain appearances away but, rather,
are now equipped with, even burdened by, a means of reaching out via on-going abduction to the world of appearances and into
the world of explanations. They are now creative beings, henceforth unaware that the source of their creativity was an image of
the relationships within which they participated and which they now sought to explain. The second problem concerns the way
in which (the mechanism by which) the primal trope spreads through a population of protohumans. This is a general problem.
It recurs in all evolutionary accounts concerning the survival, spread and eventual dominance of « hopeful monsters ». I briefly
addressed it above by proposing that an outcome of self-awareness was to re-present and reduce the world « to the statistical
mean of all extant configurations of relationships ». This is not enough. I might argue that to the extent that the primal trope
conditions present and future engagement for ego so ego’s relationships with others will condition their present and future
engagement. I might build on this suggestion by drawing from Sperber’s epidemiological model (1985, 1996) of the spread of
representations. That model, of course, is at base a genetically uncommitted Darwinian model in which the prime mover of
change at the level of populations is selection. The third problem concerns the fact that by proposing a « primal trope » I have
reified a set of relations that cannot be ¢ or should not be ¢ reified. This is a difficult and interesting problem. To assign a name
is to reify a relation. There are no trees, there are only particular trees, the taxon « tree » reifies our fundamentally tropic
understanding of a domain of perceived similarities between particular trees. The domain is specified by a set of relations and
is objectified by assigning a name. For analysts who seek to prioritize relations (processes) relative to entities (products) there is
a huge problem here. The analyst cannot proceed without imposing categories, which at some level must be arbitrary, on the
material to be analysed; he or she cannot proceed ¢ cannot speak, cannot write ¢ without seeming to reduce relations to objects.
I have decided to live with the demon of reductionism on an understanding that in a world of multiple relationships, « things »
are both inevitable and necessary because only with individuated « things » (actual or imagined) can the ambiguity inherent in
those relationships be reduced (cf. Wilden, 1972, on the role of abstract digital constructions in communication).
13. In a recent unpublished paper Godelier (2002) wrote: « The imaginary is not the symbolic, even though the two are
inseparable. The imaginary consists of shared ideas and beliefs whose meaning is expressed in signs and symbols. The imaginary
is therefore not simply thought. It is symbolically inscribed in the body, in the things that humans make, in monuments, in the
organization of space and time. But the stated aim of these imaginary constructions and symbolic practices is not only
imaginary or not only symbolic. [...] The imaginary and the symbolic [...] have real social consequences which are not all in the
mind. [...] If one must ascribe a primacy to one of these three dimensions, all of which are real, it should clearly go to the
imaginary and not to the symbolic. Symbols die once they have lost their meaning, not only the meaning from which they
sprang, but all the meanings they have accrued to them in the course of their existence. « The imaginary, however, is forever.
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scientific biology14. For present purposes, it is
less important than the second difficulty.
Ingold fails to allow a place for metaphor. At
base the engagement of which he writes exists in
a material world of ecological relationships and
the persons he constructs are similarly groun-
ded. That they are grounded is important for, in
this, he avoids appeal to explanation based in
imagined homunculi. But to me, at its source,
through its on-going expression, and in its poten-
tial, human engagement with the world, and the
persons unfolding through that engagement, are
always and necessarily grounded in metaphor, in
tropes, in the imagination. Without this unders-
tanding there is a risk, a risk implied by my
quotations from Waddington, Rappaport and
Uexküll, that Ingold has identified the subjective
experience which distinguishes the living from
the non-living but has failed to mark out that
domain of the living which qualifies as human.
In my own imaginings, therefore, I seek an
ethnoecology which combines the substantive
understandings of Ingold with the often elusive
temptations of Bateson. An ethnoecology that,
in drawing from both environmental engage-
ment and social understandings, no longer needs
to ask « which came first? » or posit polarities
and causal arrows that have no salience in the
developmental trajectories of so many people
(cf. Bamford, 1998). An ethnoecology which
acknowledges that perceptions of the environ-
ment are grounded in tropes, that the environ-
ment as experienced emerges from this ground,
and that the imaginary cannot be divorced from
livelihood, dwelling and skill. An ethnoecology
in which personhood, sociality and the imagina-
tion « grow » in contexts that people themselves
abductively create. An ethnoecology which, like
Bulmer’s scheme for organizing classificatory
data, is theoretically open-ended, that allows
that in different times and places people expe-
rience and understand their relations to environ-
ment in very different ways. An ethnoecology
which recognises that, as analysts, we ourselves
may only imagine those different ways if we
accept that they are always outcomes of the play
of the imagination of others.
All this is important to the development of
ethnoecology. We should not forget that ethnoe-
cology must aim to understand and explain eco-
logy as experienced and that, ultimately, the pro-
ject should reveal the diversity of human
ecological experience. In current approaches
there is a tendency to universalize by portraying
the experience of some people as the experience
of all, to prioritize our interpretations of the
experience of those who we judge to be the least
disembedded, the experience of those who live in
societies where « local and implicit meanings »
prevail (Hornborg, 1996: 45). But many people
do not live this way. Rather, they live in societies
where, through a process of disembedding, those
local and implicit meanings have, at least in part,
been subordinated to « abstract, totalizing sys-
tems » and to understandings and practices that,
so often, are guided by entrenched polarities
(Hornborg, 1996: 45). Here, then, we must
accept that it will be these understandings and
practices which shape the experience of those
people. We must allow that an ethnoecological
appreciation of « the west » may be quite unlike
that of « the rest ».
Early work in ethnoclassification tended to
both model and judge others with reference to an
image of ourselves. In ethnoecology we must
avoid the inverse temptation to interpret oursel-
ves in their image. We must be careful to neither
model nor judge ourselves or our compatriots in
terms of understandings drawn from people who
engage with worlds of entirely different shape.
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